Absfrocf-Buffer ovemow vulnerabilities in the memory stack continue to pose serious threats to network and computer security. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, a malicious party can strategically overwrite the return address of a procedure call, obtain control of a system, and subsequently launch more virulent attacks. SoRware countermeasures for such intrusions entail modifications to applications, compilers, and operating systems. Despite the availability of these defenses, many systems remain vulnerable to buffer overtlow attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Buffer overflows have caused security problems since the early days of computing. In 1988, the Moms Worm caused Internet havoc using a buffer overilow vulnerability as one of its means of intrusion. The Code Red worm and its variants, which stung companies over the summer of 2001, exemplifies the severity of problems that buffer overflow vulnerabilities still cause today. Code Red spread by takiig advantage of a buffer overflow problem in Microsoft IIS. The total economic cost of these worms is estimated at $2.6 billion by Computer Economics [W]. In addition, various intrusion tools that establish distributed denial of service @Dos) networks often exploit buffer overnow vulnerabilities to compromise oblivious hosts [IO] .
The vast majority of buffer overflow exploits involve an attacker "smashing the stack" and changing the return address of a targeted function to point to exploit code. Thus, protecting return addresses from corruption prevents most attacks. Past work addresses the problem through sohare methods, such as safe programming languages, operating system patches, compiler changes, and even run-time defense. However, the examination of potential solutions at the hardware architecture level is justified by the frequency of this This work was supported m part by Uls NSF under p t . 5 CCR4208946 and CCR-010567l and in part by a rcseareh g i f~ from Hewlen-Paekard type of attack, the number of years it has been causing problems, and the continuing emergence of such problems in the face existing software solutions.
We seek to implement a hardware-based, built-in, nonoptional layer of protection against common buffer overflow vulnerabilities in all future systems. Some processors contain return address stacks to reduce performance penalties due to delayed branch resolution. We detail how a modified hardware return address stack (RAS) can be used to protect return addresses. Our method preserves a correct copy of the return address and also provides a means of detecting buffer ovemows with high probability. Since the RAS is of finite size, various safe spill and fill methods are described and evaluated. Our proposal is not meant to be the only defense against such attacks, however. We recommend that our proposal be used in conjunction with existing software techniques to ultimately provide more pervasive protection.
In Section 11, we detail the buffer ovelllow problem, and we compare past work in Section III. In Section IV, we describe our secure return address stack. We discuss hardware r e m address stacks in existing processors, and we describe the architectural and OS changes that are required to achieve our security goals. In Section V, we discuss methods for handling non-LIFO procedure control flow in our proposal. In Section VI, we analyze the performance impact of our proposal. and we conclude in Section W.
n. BUFFER OVERFLQWS AND STACK SMASHING
Despite existing countermeasures, buffer overflow vulnerabilities continue to plague computer systems and networks. Table I The majority of buffer ovemow attacks involve corruption of procedure return addresses in the memory stack. During the execution of a procedure call instruction, the processor eansfers control to code that implements the target procedure. Upon completing the procedure, control is returned to the instruction following the call instruction. This transfer of control occurs in a LIFO (i.e., Last In First Out) fashion, or properly nested fashion. Thus, a procedure call stack, which is a LIFO data structure, is used to save the state between procedure calls and returns. We describe stack behavior and Figure 2 . The memory stack consists of a set of stack frames; a single frame is allocated for each procedure (e.g., g) that has yet to return control to an ancestor procedure. The stack pointer (SP) points to the top of the stack frame of the procedure that is currently executing, and the frame pointer (FP) points to the base of the stack frame for the currently executing procedure.
When function f ( ) calls g ( ) , a new stack frame is pushed onto the stack. The stack on the left of Figure 1 shows the state of the memory stack immediately following the call to g ( . The new frame includes the input pointers x and y, the procedure return address, the frame pointer, and the local variables a and b. Upon completing g (1, the program should return to the return address stored in g's stack h m e ; this address should equal the location of the instruction immediately following the call to g ( ) in the function f ( ) .
The SP and the FP should also be restored to their former values, and the stack frame belonging to g o should he effectively popped from the stack.
A security vulnerability exists in the code shown in Figure  2 because strcpy() does not perform bounds checking. In the function g ( 1, if the string to which x points exceeds the size of b, strcpy ( ) will ovenurite data located adjacent to b in the memory stack. A malicious party can exploit this situation by strategically constructing a string that contains malicious code and a corrupted return address. Lf x points to such a string, strcpy ( ) will copy malicious code into the stack, and the return address in g ( ) 's stack h e will be set to the initial instruction of the malicious exploit code. This is illushated in Figure 1 . Consequently, once g ( ) completes, the program will jump to and execute the exploit code instead of retuming control to E ( ) . There are many variations of this form of attack 1131, hut the majority relies on the ability to modify the return address. For example, rather than the attacker injecting his own exploit code, the return address may be modified to point to legitimate, preexisting code that can he used for malicious purposes.
m. PASTWORK
Researchers have proposed many, software-based countermeasures for buffer overflow explolts. These methods differ in the strength of protection provided, the effects on performance, and the ease with which they can be effectively employed. One solution is to store the stack in non-executable pages. This can prevent an attacker fium executing code injected into the memory stack. However, the return address may instead be redirected to preexisting code in memory that the attacker wishes to run for malevolent reasons. In addition, it is difficult to preserve compatibility with existing applications, compilers, and operating systems that employ executable stacks. For instance, Linux depends on executable stacks for signal handling.
StackGuard is a compiler-based solution involving a patch to gcc that defends against buffer overflow attacks that Researchers have also proposed using more secure (or safe) dialects of C and C++, for a high percentage of buffer ovemow vulnerabilities can be attributed to features o f the C programming language. Cyclone is a dialect o f C that focuses on general program safety, including the prevention of stack smashing attacks [9] . Safe programming languages have proven to be very effective in practice. While programs written in Cyclone may require less SCNPU~OUS checking for certain types of vulnerabilities, the downside is that programmers have to learn the numerous distinctions from C, and legacy application source code must be rewritten and recompiled. In addition, safe programming dialects can cause significant performance degradation and executable code bloat.
Methods for the static, automated detection of buffer oveflow vulnerabilities in code have also been developed [22, 23, 241. Using such techniques, complex application source code can be scanned prior to compilation in order to discover potential buffer overtlow weaknesses. The detection mechanisms are not perfect: many false positives and false negatives can occur. Also, as true with Cyclone, these techniques ultimately require the progammer to inspect and often rewrite sections of application source code.
Transparent run-time defenses have also been proposed.
The dynamically loaded libraries libsafe and libverify provide a run-time defense against stack smashing attacks and do not require programs to be re-compiled [l] . libsafe intercepts unsafe C library functions and performs boundschecking to protect frame pointers and return addresses. libverify protects programs by saving a copy of every function and every return address in the heap. The fmt instruction of the original function is overwritten to execute code that stores the return address and jumps to the copied function code. The return instruction in the copied function is replaced with a jump to code that verifies the retum address before returning.
The downside to libsafe is that it only defends against buffer overflow intrusions resulting from certain C library functions. In addition, static linking of these C library functions in a particular executable precludes libsafe from protecting the program. Implementations of libverify can double the code space required for each process, which is taxing for embedded devices with limited memory. Also, libverify can degrade performance by as much as 15% for some applications.
We compare past work to our solution in Table II . Our hardware-based solution enables built-in, transparent protection against common buffer overflow vulnerabilities without requiring user or application progammer effort. We observe that our proposal is the only solution that combines the features of support for legacy code, wide applicability to various platforms, low performance impact, a negligible increase in code size, and strong protection against procedure return address corruption.
IV. A SECURE ADDRESS STACK
We now describe low-cost enhancements to the core hardware and software of future programmable machines that enable the detection and prevention of return address corruption. More specifically, we modify the implementation of procedure call and return instructions, employ a special hardware retum address stack, and present a secure method for swapping the contents of the hardware stack to and from memory. Since we do not require changes to programming languages or application source code, both legacy and future software applications can benefit from the security provided by these enhancements.
A. Hardware Return Address Stack
The branch target of a procedure return instruction is often calculated using the contents of one or more registers andor memory words. Therefore, the target address cannot be resolved until the return instruction has passed through several stages of the processor pipeline. Due to the LIFO nature of procedure calls, a simple stack structure that stores return addresses can facilitate highly accurate prediction ofthe return instruction. The address of the following instruction (i.e., the retum address) is pushed onto the RAS. During the execution of a return instruction, the topmost entry of the RAS is popped and used as the predicted target (instead of using an entry from the BTB). The RAS is unaffected during the target prediction of other branch and jump instructions. RAS structures are often implemented as circular bufkrs. When overtlow of the RAS occurs, the least recently pushed address is overwritten with the value ofthe most recent retum address. We henceforth refer to the hardware return address stack as the RAS, and we refer to the call stack for storing local variables and return addresses in memory as the memory stack.
Unfortunately, the RAS provides no protection against cormption of the retum addresses in the memory stack. When a call insmction is executed, a valid return address is pushed on to the hardware RAS, and depending on the IS& the return address may also he stored in the memory stack. Suppose the return address is subsequently corrupted by a buffer overflow in memory. At the moment when a valid return instruction is fetched, the corrupted address is located in a register or a memory location specified by the return instruction. Upon full execution of this instruction, the processor learns that the value popped h m the hardware RAS does not equal the retum address associated with the instruction. However, rather than jump to the correct return address popped from the hardware RAS, the processor starts executing instructions beginning at the cormpted return address. The instructions issued and executed speculatively based upon the correct return address ftom the RAS are nullified. The processor does not employ the uncorrupted address from the RAS because the RAS contents are treated as branch prediction "hints" that are not expected to always be correct.
B. Architectural Modifications
By using special protected hardware and memory structures, we can defend against retum address corruption in the memory stack. We require a special hardware RAS, the We maintain the ISA definitions and visible behavior of call and return instructions, but we alter the manner in which the processor executes these instructions. Upon executing a procedure call instruction, the processor always pushes the return address onto the top of S U S . The program counter is set to the target of the call instruction. When a processor executes a return instruction, the return address popped h m the top of the hardware SRAS -not the target specified by a register or memory value -is assigned to the processor's program counter. The processor then determines whether the return address from the memory stack equals the return address popped from the SRAS. If these addresses differ, corruption has occurred, and the processor can terminate the current process, inform the OS of the corruption by issuing a new invalid return address trap, or continue execution of the program based upon the correct address popped h m the secure RAS.
C.
The SRAS core consists of an n-address stack implemented as a circular buffer. We now rely on the SRAS to store an arbitrary number of return addresses, but the number of nested return addresses in a program may exceed the number of entries in the SRAS. Therefore, to avoid overwriting valid addresses, we must define an efficient method for the processor to securely swap the contents of the SRAS to memory when the SRAS becomes completely full. We define the event in which the SRAS becomes full following a call instruction as overtlow; the event where the SRAS becomes empty following a return is defined as underflow. We discuss
Swapping Contents of the SRAS
the typical stack depth sizes observed for common programs in Section VI.
Upon overflow, the processor will store the n/2 least recently pushed addresses to memory underflow, and the processor will retrieve up to d 2 most recently pushed addresses from memory in the event of underflow. The processor stores and retrieves n/2 addresses to and 60m memory rather than all n addresses to prevent an SRAS thrashing scenario. In some programs, a policy of transferring the entire contents of the SRAS could lead to frequent storage of all SRAS addresses to memory immediately followed by the retrieval of n SRAS addresses from memory. We investigate two different approaches to handling SRAS swapping: operating system-managed and processor-managed swapping.
OSmanaged SRAS Swapping. In the first approach, the operating system assumes complete responsibility for swapping SRAS entries. The processor issues an OS interrupt in the events of SRAS overflow or underflow. The OS then executes code that transfers contents of the SRAS to or from memory; the application does not observe or participate in SRAS content transfers. The kernel is responsible for managing the memory structures required to store the spilled SRAS entries for all threads running on the system. This is achieved by simply maintaining one stack of spilled SRAS re" addresses for each process. In addition, the virtual memory regions that store the SRAS contents are mapped to physical pages that can only he accessed by the kernel. Hence, user-level application threads cannot corrupt the contents of their respective spilled stacks.
Processor-managed SRAS Swapping. In this scheme, we implement hardware enhancements to reduce the number of OS invocations associated with SRAS overflow and underflow. We store information in the processor concerning the physical memory locations of the OS-managed data structures that contain spilled SRAS addresses. Upon SRAS underflow or overtlow, the processor can employ this information to directly transfer SRAS contents to and from physical memory rather than invoking the OS. To support this functionality, the processor maintains two pointers to two physical pages that store spilled SRAS contents for the active process. Also, the processor maintains a counter that indicates how much space is available in the two physical pages. Although the two pages may be virtually or physically separated in memory, the two pages are treated as being adjacent to form a single "superpage." When the superpage underflows or overflows, the OS is invoked to allocate a new physical page or deallocate one of the two physical pages.
The processor maintains two pointers to two physical pages rather than one pointer for one physical page in order to avoid a thrashing scenario in which a page is repeatedly allocated and immediately deallocated. In such a trashing situation, the OS could be invoked for every SRAS spill and fill, and performance would decay. By providing the processor with access to two physical frames at once, we can avoid calls to the OS caused hy jumping back and forth over a page boundary. The processor logic required to manage the two pointers and the counter is based upon a simple 4-state machine. The two bits that represent the machine state are stored by the processor in the high order bits ofthe counter.
The OS is invoked much less often in this scheme than in the OS-managed swapping scheme. For example, if the SRAS consists of 64 8-byte return address entries and the page size is 8 KEI, the OS is invoked only once &er 8192/((64/2)xS) = 32 consecutive SRAS overflows. In the OS-managed scheme, the OS would be invoked for each of those 32 SRAS overflows. In Section VI, we compare the performance impact ofthese two schemes on a set of benchmark programs.
We also note that since the values popped from the SRAS must always be valid to preserve correct execution, all of the SRAS contents and any associated configuration state bits must be transferred to and 60m memory on context switches.
D. Security Ana/ysis
Our primary design goal is to prevent attacks in which hostile code is injected and executed on innocent hosts by exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities that corrupt procedure return addresses. The modifications described above accomplish this goal: we defined architecture based on a secure retun address stack that detects and prevents any corruption of return addresses. In our system, only call and return instructions can modify the contents of the SRAS. Hence, the correct return addresses will be preserved in the event of a standard buffer overflow attack that corrupts the values of return addresses in the memory stack. If such corruption does occur in memory, the processor detects this and can respond appropriately.
Since the SRAS is finite in size, its contents must he securely swapped to and 6om memory upon overflow and underflow, respectively, to guarantee security. In both the OS-managed and processor-managed SRAS schemes, we protect spilled SRAS contents by storing the addresses in physical pages that are not accessible by the virtual memory spaces of user-level applications.
Because non-kernel processes cannot access the contents spilled from their respective SRASes, no software hug or buffer overflow vulnerability in such processes can affect the spilled return addresses.
To provide truly pervasive and comprehensive protection against buffer overflow and related attacks, our solution should he implemented in conjunction with existing software defenses. Software-based security solutions encourage safe programming practices and identify a wide variety of security vulnerabilities in new code. Our proposal complements these solutions by offering specialized dynamic protection for legacy code and preventing potential attacks in new code that may be unrecognized by the software defenses. In addition, since we require changes to hardware, our proposal is meant to he a long-term solution. Sofhvare defenses, however, can and should be applied as they become available.
V. NON-LIFO PROCEDURE C O~O L FLOW
If software always exhibited LIFO procedure control flow behavior, the SRAS would transparently provide hardwarebased protection of return addresses for all programs. No compiler changes or recompilation of existing source code would be necessary: the system would provide protection for all legacy and future binary executables. Unfortunately, however, some existing executables use non-LIFO procedure control flow. For example, some compilers seek to improve performance by allowing certain procedures to return to an address located deep within the stack. The memory stack pointer is then set to an address of a frame buried within the stack; the frames located in between the former top of the stack and the reassigned stack pointer are effectively popped and discarded. Exception handling in C++ is one technique that can lead to such non-LIFO behavior.
Other common causes of non-LIFO control flow are the C setjmp and longjmp library functions. These functions are employed to support software signal handling. The longjmp function may cause a program to return to an address that is located deep within the memory stack or to an address that is no longer located in the memory stack. More specifically, a particular return address may be explicitly pushed onto the stack only once, hut procedures may retum to that address more than once. Note that tail call optimizations, which seem to involve non-LIFO procedure control flow, do not cause problems for the SRAS. Compilers typically maintain proper pairing of procedure call and retum instructions when implementing tail call optimizations.
Our security proposal depends on the correctness of the address popped h m the top of the hardware SRAS.
However, the SRAS mechanism described so far does not accommodate non-LIFO procedure control flow. We can address this issue in at least four ways. These four options trade varying degrees of security and non-LIFO support for implementation cost and complexity.
The first two options enable zero or complete support for non-LIFO behavior while facilitating high or low security against procedure return address corruption, respectively. The first option is to implement the SRAS as described above and completely prohibit code and compiler practices that employ non-LIFO procedure control flow. This provides the highest degree of security against return address corruption. Legacy executables that exhibit non-LIFO procedure calling behavior will terminate with an error (if not recompiled). The second option is to allow users to disable the SRAS with a new sras-of f instruction. This ,enables the execution of potentially insecure code that exhibits any non-LIFO behavior as permitted in systems without an SRAS.
The third option is to permit certain types of non-LIFO procedure control flow such as returning to addresses located deep within the stack. This option requires re-compilation of some legacy programs. During re-compilation, the compiler must take precautions to ensure that the top of the SRAS will always contain the correct target address for an executed return instruction in programs that use non-LIFO techniques.
We define new instructions, s r a s g u s h and srasgop, which explicitly push and pop entries to and h m the SRAS without actually calling or returning h m a procedure. Compilers can employ these new instructions to return to an address deep within the SRAS (and to the associated frame in the memory stack) when using longjmp, C++ exception handling, or other non-LIFO routines.
The fourth option is to provide dynamic support for common non-LIFO behavior. This approach does not support all instances of non-LIFO behavior that the second option can handle via re-compilation, but it does allow execution of some legacy executahles (where the source code is no longer available) that exhibit non-LIFO procedure control flow. First, we implement the s r a s g u s h and s r a s g o p instructions described above. We also need an installationtime or run-time software filter that strategically injects s r a s g u s h and s r a s g o p instructions (as well as other small blocks of code) into binaries prior to or during execution. The software filter inserts these instructions in recognized routines that cause non-LIFO procedure control flow. For instance, standardized functions like setjmp and longjmp can be identified at run-time via inspection of linked libraries such as libc. This option only handles executahles that employ known non-LIFO techniques, however. For new manifestations of non-LIFO procedure control flow, the software filter may not identify some locations where the new instructions should be inserted.
Regardless of the method@) used to handle non-LIFO procedure control flow, we require that the SRAS be "turned on" by default in order to provide built-in protection. Our architecture definition stipulates that the SRAS is always enabled unless explicitly turned off by the user, at his own risk.
VI. PERFORMANCEIMPACT We now examine the performance impact of spilling and retrieving the contents of the SRAS to and from memory during program execution. The architectural enhancements that we propose enable security features for all programs, rather than just for network-based applications. Because of this, a performance study that examines the impact of our proposed architectural changes on all programs is more useful than one limited to network applications. Thus, we use SPEC2000 benchmarks to represent a "general-purpose" workload [21].
A. Simulation Methodologv
To obtain performance data for the benchmarks, we use Simplescalar, a cycle-accurate out-of-order superscalar processor simulator [3]. We consider the scenario in which the operating system is invoked each time a S U S swap is required and the scenario where the processor primarily handles SRAS swapping. The OS-managed swapping scheme is easier to implement, but the processor-managed scheme can provide better performance. We simulate the execution of 500 million instructions of 12 SPEC2000 integer benchmarks after skipping at least 1 billion instructions in order to capture steady state behavior [17] .
Our base processor model closely represents an Alpha 21264 processor [6] . We summarize the processor simulation parameters in Table IU . The base processor includes a hardware return address stack that is implemented as a circular buffer. In some situations, speculative execution can pollute the RAS with invalid addresses. Hence, to maintain the integrity of the SRAS, the processor must include a perfect repair mechanism to recover iiom SRAS corruption due to branch mispredictions [19]. Such mechanisms involve saving the topof-stack (TOS) pointer and the return address to which the TOS points following the prediction of a branch instruction. If the processor discovers that a particular branch was mispredicted and the wmng program control path was followed, the processor can use information such as the saved TOS to restore the SRAS to its former, correct state (preceding the mispredicted branch).
We gather performance results for all 12 benchmarks, SRAS sizes of 16, 32, 64, 128, and infinite entries, and page sizes of 8 KB, 16 KB, and 32 KB. To model the SRAS swapping code in the OS-managed swapping scheme, we wrote a swapping and memory management routine in C. We also wrote C code that models the allocation and deallocation of physical pages during OS invocations in the processormanaged swapping scheme. We compile the SPEC2000 benchmarks and our OS swapping code on an Alpha machine with full optimizations to produce Alpha executables.
We simulate the execution of our SRAS swapping and page allocation routines assuming the caches are initially cold. We obtain cycle counts for all four OS routines: spilling the SRAS to memory in the OS-managed scheme, tilling the SRAS from memory in the OS-managed scheme, allocating a new physical page in the processor-managed scheme, and deallocating a physical page in the processor-managed scheme. We find that each of these four routines requires between 23,000 and 25,000 cycles to complete. These cycle counts vary with the size of the SRAS.
In addition, we simulate the spilling and filling of SRAS contents directly to and &om physical memory in the processor-managed SRAS swapping scheme by stalling the processor for a number of cycles. This stall time represents the number of cycles required to transfer d 2 SRAS entries directly to or from main memory. The bus Srom the processor to main memory in our model can transfer one 64-bit value every two cycles after an initial latency. In the event of underflow, the fmt load experiences the main memory latency of 100 cycles, and then the (n/2 -1) subsequent addresses anive at the processor every other cycle for ( n -2) cycles.
Hence, the total stall time is (98 + n) cycles. Similarly, in the event of overtlow in this scheme, the processor stalls for (98 + n) cycles to store d2 addresses to main memory. Figure 4 illustrates maximum and mean depths of the return address stack associated with the benchmarks. We observe that the return address stacks for the SPEC2000 benchmarks never exceed depths of 108 addresses. The mean depths of the return address stacks for the SPEC2000 benchmarks range from 4.72 to 29.94 addresses. Although Figure 4 provides an appropriate guide for choosing the SRAS size, the figure does not present precise information concerning the performance impact of the SRAS on the benchmarks. The SRAS only negatively impacts performance when its contents are swapped to or h m memory. Hence, instead of hinging on maximum and mean stack depths, performance primarily depends on the rates at which the memory stack (and thus the SRAS) grows and shrinks.
Branch Predictor
The performance penalties caused by SRAS swapping in the SPEC2000 benchmarks are presented in Table W . These statistics represent percent performance degradation caused by an n-entry SRAS relative to the base machine model that includes an n-entry return address stack. The entries listed in bold indicate the situations in which the performance degradation exceeds 1%. For an SRAS size of 16 entries in the OS-managed scheme, 6 of the 12 SPEC2000 integer benchmarks experience performance reductions ranging from 4.7% to 67.9%. If the SRAS contains 64 entries, the performance degradation caused by OS-managed swapping is negligible (i.e., 1% or less) for all benchmarks except for parser. The parser benchmark is a syntactic parser of English in which the memory stack grows and shrinks quickly; thus, SRAS swapping penalties can be significant.
When the SRAS contains 128 or more entries, the performance impact is negligible for all of the benchmarks.
In the processor-managed scheme, however, the performance degradation is less than or equal to 1% for all of the benchmarks when using a SRAS of size 16 entries or greater. We therefore conclude that the processor-managed SRAS swapping scheme is superior to the OS-managed SRAS swapping scheme. The processor-managed scheme achieves much higher performance than the OS-managed scheme at the cost of a small, incremental implementation effort.
W. CONCLUSION
Malicious parties often exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities to enable the insertion or execution of hostile code on an innocent user's machine by corrupting procedure retum addresses in the memory stack. Due to the growing threat of attacks such as distributed denial of service, addressing such buffer overflow vulnerabilities has become a security priority.
Although software-based countermeasures are available, a processor architecture defense is justified because of the fact that major security problems stemming from buffer overflows continue to plague networks and computer systems.
We described a secure hardware r e m address stack (SRAS) that detects and prevents corruption of procedure return addresses. The SRAS only requires minor changes to the compiler, the operating system, and the branch prediction structures found in many microprocessors, so legacy and future software can enjoy the security benefits without modifying application source code. We presented new approaches to managing and swapping the S U S , and we
presented new results that demonstrate the SRAS causes a negligible performance impact in most applications.
Our hardware-based solution should be applied in tandem with existing s o h a r e countermeasures to provide truly robust protection against buffer overflow attacks. In future work, we will explore SRAS enhancements, and we will investigate alternative techniques for preventing buffer overilow attacks.
